Access recertification across every account and role
For: IT security manager or identity owner running the periodic access review
The pain today
Managers receive a spreadsheet of entitlements and approve all of it, because nobody can judge that many rows. Leavers, role changes and toxic combinations pass through every cycle.
The ask
“I attached the entitlement exports from our systems, the staff roster with roles and leavers, and our access policy. For every person, tell me which access does not fit their role, which accounts belong to nobody, and which combinations break segregation of duties. Show the rows.”
Plain words, as you would say it to a colleague. Edit it to fit your case before you send it.
What you attach or connect
- Entitlement exports per system
- Staff roster with roles, managers and leavers
- Access policy and role baselines
- Segregation-of-duties rules
The unit of work
One worker task per one person or service account with its entitlements.
Why a swarm fits
Each identity is judged from its own rows, its role and the policy. Nothing about one person is needed to judge another, so the floor can match the roster.
Not for
A small team on one system: the admin console's own report is enough.
The decision tree
5 typed decisions, each with an action for every answer
At fixed moments in a run, the engine puts one narrow question to a decision model. The decision model never writes text: it answers yes or no with a probability, picks from listed options, or gives a score, about a small slice of the material. The engine then does exactly what this tree says, which is what makes the run auditable. The thresholds are the template's design values, not measured results.
Planner, while planning
Scope checkA choice among options
Before work starts on a unit
Does this account match exactly one person or registered service on the roster?
Sees only: One account's export rows and the candidate roster entries
Why: Orphans are listed rather than guessed, and leaver accounts go straight to a person.
- One clear matchthenAccept
- Several possible matchesthenEscalate to a strong model
- No match on the rosterthenMark unresolved
- Matches a leaverthenAsk a person
Before workers, before a task runs
Small worker or strong modelYes or no, with a probability
Before a task runs
Does this identity hold administrative, payment approval or production entitlements that warrant the strong reviewer?
Sees only: The identity's entitlement names
Why: Most identities are routine; the dangerous ones get the careful read.
- Yes: 0.50 or higherthenEscalate to a strong model
- Unsure: 0.20 up to 0.50thenEscalate to a strong model
- No: below 0.20thenAccept
After workers, the judge checks
Evidence checkYes or no, with a probability
After a worker answers
Does the quoted policy rule exclude this entitlement for the role on the roster row, rather than simply not mention it?
Sees only: The export row, the roster row and the quoted policy rule
Why: A flag a manager cannot trust gets the whole pack approved unread.
- Yes: 0.85 or higherthenAccept
- Unsure: 0.50 up to 0.85thenMark unresolved
- No: below 0.50thenReject and retry
Reconciler, while merging
Conflict checkYes or no, with a probability
While reconciling
Do these two entitlements held by one identity match both sides of one segregation rule, such as creating a supplier and approving its payment?
Sees only: Two export rows for one identity and one segregation-of-duties rule
Why: Toxic combinations are invisible row by row and only show up as a pair.
- Yes: 0.85 or higherthenAccept
- Unsure: 0.50 up to 0.85thenEscalate to a strong model
- No: below 0.50thenContinue
Accountable person, before anything is settled
Person decidesYes or no, with a probability
Before anything is reported as settled
Does this review pack contain any flag whose action would remove access from a person or disable an account?
Sees only: One manager's review pack
Why: Managers and system owners approve or revoke; nothing is removed automatically.
Accountable: Managers and system owners approve or revoke; nothing is removed automatically. The roster is personal data and needs access limits.
- Yes: 0.30 or higherthenAsk a person
- Unsure: 0.10 up to 0.30thenAsk a person
- No: below 0.10thenAccept
The fleet: who does what
Model tiers by role, not brands: you choose the models. Strong reasoning models plan and reconcile, small fast models do the wide work, and the judge is a decision model from a different family, so it does not share the workers' blind spots.
Planner
A strong reasoning model turns policy and duty rules into checks per role and matches identities across systems.
Decisions here:1. Scope check
Workers
Small fast workers from an open-weight family each review one identity's entitlements against its role baseline.
Designed for 40 to 1,000 agents, one worker task per one person or service account with its entitlements. Each worker receives only its own unit.
Decisions here:2. Small worker or strong model
Judge, from a different model family
A decision model from a different family checks each flagged entitlement against the quoted policy rule and export row.
Decisions here:3. Evidence check
Reconciler
A strong reasoning model builds review packs per manager and keeps identity-matching doubts visible.
Decisions here:4. Conflict check
Accountable person
Managers and system owners approve or revoke; nothing is removed automatically. The roster is personal data and needs access limits.
Decisions here:5. Person decides
Checked before anything is accepted
- Every flag cites the export row and the policy rule
- Accounts matching no roster entry are listed as orphans, not guessed
- Duty conflicts name both entitlements and the rule they break
- Identities matched across systems on weak evidence are marked
What comes back
- Review packs per manager with only the flagged access
- Orphan and leaver accounts
- Segregation-of-duties conflicts
- Roles whose baseline is missing or outdated
What to measure
- Flags revoked against flags raised
- Leaver accounts found
- Manager review time
- Audit findings on access after the cycle
Names of measures only. No result is claimed for this template.
Templates open in the workspace chat with the ask filled in. Nothing runs until you send it.
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